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• We analyze a cheap talk model where an exit option is available for the sender.
• An informative equilibrium exists if the sender’s bias is sufficiently large.
• A large bias makes the sender’s exit more likely.
• This gives the receiver an incentive to choose an action desirable for the sender.
• In turn, this gives the sender an incentive to send an accurate information.
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a b s t r a c t
We consider a cheap talk model with the sender’s exit option. We show that in the case of discrete action
space, it can be the case that there exists an informative equilibrium if and only if the sender’s bias is
sufficiently small or sufficiently large. The latter case is sharply contrasting with the existing results of
cheap talk.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. N1. Introduction
Cheap talk models have been used in considering the infor-
mation transmission problem within relationships and organiza-
tions.1 A player with informational advantage about the state of
the world, called a sender, tries to transmit information about the
state to another player, called a receiver, sending a cheap talk
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1 See Gibbons et al. (2012) for the survey.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-message, based on which the receiver makes a decision affecting
both players’ payoffs.
It is assumed in many cheap talk models that the sender has
no other action than sending cheap talk messages. In many real
situations, however, the sender has an exit option to terminate
the relationship or withdraw from the organization. If a customer
complained to a producer about her dissatisfaction with a good or
service, but the customer cannot see any quality improvement, she
may stop purchasing from the producer. If a worker complained to
amanager about bad conditions at theworkplace, but themanager
does not give an appropriate remedy, the worker may quit the
job.2 I believe it is important to analyze how the existence of the
exit option affects information transmission via cheap talk for an
understanding of relationships and organizations.
Shimizu (2008) deals with a variant of the Crawford and Sobel
(1982) cheap talk model where the sender has an exit option
2 These examples are taken from a so-called ‘‘exit–voice framework’’ initiated
by Hirschman (1970, 1987). Banerjee and Somanthan (2001) and Shimizu (2008)
identify ‘‘voice’’ as activity of information transmission. See Shimizu for details.
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increase the informativeness of cheap talk no matter how large
the sender’s bias is. This note presents a much stronger result;
in the case of discrete action space, it can be the case that there
exists an informative equilibrium if and only if the sender’s bias is
sufficiently small or sufficiently large. The latter fact is new in the
literature.
Themodel is as follows:Nature randomly chooses a state,which
is observed only by the sender. The sender sends a costless mes-
sage to the receiver. Based on the received message, the receiver
chooses an action relevant to both players. After the sender ob-
serves the action, he chooses whether to exercise an exit option
or not. When the exit option is chosen, both players receives pay-
offs independent from state and action. On the other hand, when
the exit option is not chosen, both players’ payoff functions are
quadratic functions dependent upon state and action where the
sender’s bliss point differs from the receiver’s. The difference is
called the sender’s bias.
In this model, a large sender’s bias implies that the sender is
likely to choose an exit option unless the receiver chooses a desir-
able action for the sender. Then, it gives the receiver an incentive
to do so as long as the receiver is sufficiently averse to the sender’s
exit, which in turn gives the sender an incentive to send an accu-
rate information to the receiver.
This is a sharply contrasting result with the existing results of
cheap talk. Crawford and Sobel (1982) shows that the smaller the
sender’s bias is, the more informative an equilibrium cheap talk
is in a so-called uniform-quadratic model, and similar results also
hold in most of the variations of the uniform-quadratic model.
Chiba and Leong (2012) is closely related to this note. They
deal with a cheap talk model with the receiver’s exit option and
demonstrate a non-monotonic effect of the bias as in this note.
However, the underlying logic is different. In their model, a more
biased sender may transmit more accurate information in order to
deter the receiver’s exit. On the other hand, it is the receiver who is
afraid of the partner’s exit inmymodel. Since amore biased sender
is more likely to exercise his exit option, the receiver is more likely
to choose a desirable action for the sender, which in turn, enables
the sender to transmit more accurate information to the receiver
without anxiety.3
In another setting than the cheap talk model, Hori (2008)
obtains the result that an agent with a more different objective is
more beneficial for the principal. Che andKartik (2009) also obtains
the result that an adviser with a more different opinion (prior) is
more beneficial for the decision maker. However, their results are
common in that some kind of incongruence is beneficial in terms
of giving the agent/advisor more incentive to acquire information,
which is irrelevant to our result.
2. Model and result
There exist two players: Sender (he) and Receiver (she). A game
proceeds as follows:
• Nature randomly chooses a state t according to the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. The realization of the state is only
observed by Sender.
• Based upon the realized state, Sender sends a costless message
m ∈ M = A. We consider the case where A = {a1, a2} where
0 ≤ a1 < a2 ≤ 1.• Based upon the received message, Receiver chooses an action
a ∈ A.
3 Therefore, Chiba and Leong focus on the case where the sender’s outside payoff
is small and the receiver’s outside payoff is large, while I focus on the opposite case,
or one where the sender’s outside payoff is large and the receiver’s is small.• After observing a, Sender chooses whether he stays or exits.
Both players’ payoffs when Sender chooses to exit are normal-
ized to 0. When Sender chooses to stay, Player i’s payoff vi(t, a)
is
vi(t, a) = Di − (t + bi − a)2 i = S, R.
Without loss of generality, we assume bS := b > 0 and bR = 0.
We call b sender’s bias. Di is the degree of i’s aversion to S’s exit
option. We focus on the situation where DS > 0 and DR > 0.
We define the informative equilibrium as an equilibriumwhere
there exists a boundary point t1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
• when Sender observes t < t1, she sendsm = a1,
• when Sender observes t > t1, she sendsm = a2, and
• when Receiver receivesm = ai, he chooses a = ai for i = 1, 2.
Let a¯ = a1+a22 . Since Sender must be indifferent between
sendingm = a1 andm = a2 at t1, t1 = a¯−bmust be satisfied in the
informative equilibrium. Note that t1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if b < a¯.
Consider the environment without an exit option, or equiva-
lently, the case of sufficiently large DS. There exists the informa-
tive equilibrium if and only if there is an incentive for Receiver to
choose a = a2 instead of a = a1 when he receives m = a2. This
condition is 1
t1

DR − (t − a2)2

dt ≥
 1
t1

DR − (t − a1)2

dt,
which is equivalent to b ≤ 1 − a¯. This implies that there exists
the informative equilibrium if and only if the bias is sufficiently
small. Throughout the rest of the section, we assume the above
inequality does not hold, in other words, b is not sufficiently
small to guarantee the existence of informative equilibrium in the
environment without exit.
Let us turn to the environment with an exit option. In this envi-
ronment, we can show that the larger b is, the more likely it is for
there to exist informative equilibrium.
Proposition 1. We assume a¯ > 12 . Suppose
DR ≥ (a2)2 +max{1− 2a1, 0}, (1)
1− a¯ < b < a¯. (2)
In the environment without an exit option, there exists no informative
equilibrium. In the environment with an exit option, there exists a
function δ(b,DR) strictly increasing in b such that there exists the
informative equilibrium if and only if
√
DS ≤ δ(b,DR).
We relegate the proof to the Appendix. Here let me present an
intuition. Consider the case where 1−a1+b >
√
DS > 1−a2+b.
Now suppose that some t > t1 is realized. If both players follow
the equilibrium strategies, S sends m = a2 and R chooses a = a2.
(2) guarantees that vS(t, a2) > 0. In otherwords, if Rwould choose
a = a2, S would never exercise an exit option. On the other hand,
vS(t, a1) < 0 if and only if
t > a1 − b+
√
DS. (3)
In other words, when R would choose a = a1, S would choose an
exit option for t satisfying (3).
Keeping this in mind, consider the effects of an increase of b. It
directly increases the R’s incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
action a = a2 because her estimated mean becomes closer to a1.
The increase of b, however, has another effect, which can be named
the exit inducement effect. In other words, it increases R’s perceived
probability that S would choose an exit option in response to R’s
deviation,while it does not affect S’s exit behavior if Rwould follow
the equilibrium action. This exit inducement effect overwhelms
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exit, is sufficiently large. Moreover, (3) implies that the larger b
is, the larger the perceived probability of S’s exit and the bigger
the exit inducement effect is, and therefore, the less incentive to
deviate R has.
It is interesting to compare this result within the case of con-
tinuous action space. In the case of continuous action space, ac-
tions can be more flexibly adjusted in response to the change of
messages, which can mitigate both direct effect and exit induce-
ment effect. This is because the effects of the increase of the bias
are much more ambiguous in Shimizu (2008).
Lastly, we consider the welfare implication. Suppose that the
premise of Proposition 1 holds and δ(b,DR) ≥ √DS > 1− a2+ b.4
LetVNEi andV
E
i be the ex ante equilibriumpayoffs for i in themodels
without and with S’s exit option, respectively. Then, we obtain5
V ES − VNES = (1− t1)(a2 − a1)(1− a¯+ b) > 0,
V ER − VNER = (1− t1)(a2 − a1)(1− a¯− b) < 0.
This implies that more informative communication caused by S’s
exit option hurts R, while it benefits S. Note that the above result
does not directly imply that the possibility of S’s exit option always
hurts R in general settings. Shimizu (2008) shows that it also
benefits R in the case of continuum action space.
3. Conclusion
Wepresent a cheap talkmodelwith the sender’s exit option and
discrete action space. We show that if the sender’s bias is so large
that there exists no informative equilibrium in the environment
without an exit option, the much larger the sender’s bias is, the
more likely it is that there exists an informative equilibrium. This
is a sharply contrasting result with the existing results of cheap
talk that tell us that the smaller the sender’s bias is, the more
informative the information transmission via cheap talk is.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
Let V (m, a) be the expected payoff R would obtain by choosing
a in response to m when S follows the equilibrium strategy.
Throughout the proof, we denote
√
DS = d.
We consider the R’s incentive to choose a = a2 in response to
m = a2. Denote (1− a¯+ b)(V (a2, a2)− V (a2, a1)) = g(d; b,DR).
We divide the situation into the following four cases:
Case 2-1: d ≥ 1− a1 + b.
In this case S never chooses an exit option no matter which
action R chooses. This implies that the incentive condition for R
is the same as one in the environment without an exit option, and
therefore it is not satisfied under (2).
Case 2-2: 1− a1 + b ≥ d ≥ 1− a2 + b.
In this case,
g =
 1
a¯−b
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt −
 a1−b+d
a¯−b
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt.
Then we obtain
g ′′ = 2(d− b) ≥ 0,
g ′(1− a1 + b) = −DR + (1− a1)2 < 0.
4 The proof of Proposition 1 shows that this interval is non-empty.
5 Under the premise of Proposition 1,
 1
0 vR(t, a1)dt >
 1
0 vR(t, a2)dt holds,
which implies that R chooses a1 in the model without S’s exit option.The 2nd inequality of the 2nd line is obtained from (1). We also
have
g(1− a2 + b) > 0,
g(1− a1 + b) < 0,
from the analysis of Case 2-1 and 2-3, respectively. It follows that
there exists a unique solution for d ∈ (1 − a2 + b, 1 − a1 + b) to
g(d; b,DR) = 0, denoted by δ(b,DR). Moreover, for any d belong-
ing to the case under consideration, g(d; b,DR) ≥ 0 if and only if
d ≤ δ(b,DR).
By the implicit function theorem,
∂δ
∂b
= 1− 2b(a2 − a1)
DR − (δ − b)2
> 1− 2b(a2 − a1)
DR − (1− a1)2
≥ 1− 2b(a2 − a1)
(a2)2 +max{1− 2a1, 0} − (1− a1)2
> 1− (a2)
2 − (a1)2
(a2)2 +max{1− 2a1, 0} − (1− a1)2
= max{0, 2a1 − 1}
(a2)2 +max{1− 2a1, 0} − (1− a1)2
≥ 0.
The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th lines are obtained from the fact δ < 1−a1+b,
(1), and (2), respectively.
Case 2-3: 1− a2 + b ≥ d ≥ a2 − a¯.
In this case,
g =
 a2−b+d
a¯−b
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt −
 a1−b+d
a¯−b
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt
= (a2 − a1)

DR − b2 − (a2 − a1)
2
12

.
This is strictly positive from (1) and (2).
Case 2-4: d ≤ a2 − a¯.
In this case,
g =
 a2−b+d
a2−b−d
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt
= 2d

DR − d
2
3
− b2

.
This is strictly positive from (1) and (2).
To sum up, R has an incentive to choose a = a2 in response to
m = a2 if and only if d ≤ δ(b,DR).
Next, we consider the R’s incentive to choose a = a1 in response
tom = a1. Below, we will show that it is always satisfied under (1)
and (2). Denote (a¯ − b)(V (a1, a1) − V (a1, a2)) = h(d; b,DR). We
divide the situation into the following three cases:
Case 1-1: b ≥ a1.
Moreover, this case is divided into the following four subcases:
Case 1-1-1: d ≥ a2 − b.
In this case,
h =
 a¯−b
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt −
 a¯−b
0
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt
= a¯2 − b2.
This is strictly positive from (2).
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In this case,
h =
 a¯−b
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt −
 a¯−b
a2−b−d
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt.
We obtain
h′′ = 2(d+ b) > 0,
h′(a2 − b) = −DR + (a2)2 ≤ 0,
h(a2 − b) > 0.
The 2nd line is obtained from (1) and the 3rd line was already
verified in Case 1-1-1. The above inequalities are sufficient for
h > 0.
Case 1-1-3: a2−a12 ≥ d ≥ b− a1.
In this case,
h =
 a¯−b+d
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt.
We obtain
h′′ = −2(d− b).
If d ≥ b, we obtain
h′

a2 − a1
2

= DR −

a2 − a1
2
− b
2
.
This is strictly positive from (1) and (2). On the other hand, if d ≤ b,
we obtain
h′(b− a1) = DR − (a1)2.
This is strictly positive from (1). Then, in any case, it suffices to
show h(b− a1) ≥ 0. Indeed, it is verified h(b− a1) = 0.
Case 1-1-4: d ≤ b− a1.
In this case, h = 0.
Case 1-2: a1 ≥ b ≥ 3a1−a22 .
Moreover, this case is divided into the following four subcases:
Case 1-2-1: d ≥ a2 − b.
This case is the same as Case 1-1-1.
Case 1-2-2: a2 − b ≥ d ≥ a2−a12 .
In this case,
h =
 a¯−b
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt −
 a¯−b
a2−b−d
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt.
We obtain
h′′ = 2(b+ d) > 0,
h′(a2 − b) = −DR + (a2)2 ≤ 0,
h(a2 − b) > 0.
The 2nd inequality is obtained from (1) and the 3rd was already
verified in Case 1-1-1. The above inequalities are sufficient for
h > 0.
Case 1-2-3: a2−a12 ≥ d ≥ a1 − b.
In this case,
h =
 a−b+d
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt.
If d ≥ b, we obtain
h′

a2 − a1
2

= DR −

a2 − a1
2
− b
2
.
This is strictly positive from (1) and (2). On the other hand, if d ≤ b,
we obtain
h′(a1 − b) = DR − (a1 − 2b)2.This is strictly positive from (1) and (2). Then, in any case, it suffices
to show h(a1 − b) ≥ 0, which is reduced to Case 1-2-4.
Case 1-2-4: d ≥ a2 − b.
In this case,
h =
 a1−b+d
a1−b+d
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt
= 2d

DR − d
2
3
− b2

.
This is strictly positive from (1).
Case 1-3: b ≤ 3a1−a22 .
Moreover, this case is divided into the following four subcases:
Case 1-3-1: d ≥ a2 − b.
This case is the same as Case 1-1-1.
Case 1-3-2: a2 − b ≥ d ≥ a1 − b.
In this case,
h =
 a¯−b
0
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt −
 a¯−b
a2−b−d
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt.
We obtain
h′′ = 2(d+ b) > 0,
h′(a2 − b) = −DR + (a2)2 ≤ 0,
h(a2 − b) > 0.
The 2nd inequality is obtained from (1) and the 3rd was already
verified in Case 1-1-1. The above inequalities are sufficient for
h > 0.
Case 1-3-3: a1 − b ≥ d ≥ a2−a12 .
In this case,
h =
 a¯−b
a1−b−d
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt −
 a¯−b
a2−b−d
(DR − (t − a2)2)dt.
We obtain h′ = 0. Then this case is reduced to Case 1-3-4.
Case 1-3-4: d ≤ a2−a12 .
In this case,
h =
 a1−b+d
a1−b−d
(DR − (t − a1)2)dt
= 2d

DR − d
2
3
− b2

.
This is strictly positive from (1). 
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